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"MILITARY DUE PROCESS" AND SELECTION OF
COURT-MARTIAL PANELS: AN ILLOGICAL
GAP IN FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTION
By Peter L. Colt*
Introduction
Since 1951,1 personnel in the military forces of the United States
have been afforded most of the guarantees embodied in the Bill of
Rights by decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court of Military
Appeals, the Congress, and the president. However, the right to a
court-martial by a representative panel selected from the "peers" of
an enlisted accused has been consistently denied.
The Supreme Court has uniformly held that the right to trial by
jury embodied in Article III, section 2 and the Sixth Amendment does
* Member, second year class.
1. In response to the complaints of servicemen concerning the administration of
military justice in World War II, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted by
Congress in 1950 and became operative the following year. Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, § 1, 64 Stat. 107, as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970). The legislation pro-
vided for a Court of Military Appeals, id. art. 67; 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1970), which, as
the highest appellate court in the military judicial system, has been called the "Supreme
Court of the Military." For discussion of the origin of the court and its contributions
to the development of servicemen's rights, see generally Willis, The United States Court
of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operation and Future, 55 Mn.. L. REv. 39 (1972).
2. "Peers," as used in this note, connotes those members of the particular military
community of which the accused is a member.
'The philosophy behind the civilian right to trial by a jury of peers chosen at ran-
dom is that there is a better chance for a fair trial if the jury represents different classes,
occupations, and perspectives within society." Sherman, Congressional Proposals for
Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CaRM. L. REv. 25, 44 (1971).
"Unquestionably officers and enlisted personnel constitute two separate and distinct
social and economic classes, and there is considerable support for the proposition that
senior grade enlisted personnel constitute a separate economic and social class from that
of the lower grade enlisted men." Benson, The Military Jury. . . An Unrepresentative
Tribunal?, 7 TnMx 40, 41 (Sept.-Oct., 1971).
For purposes of this note, the enlisted ranks will be divided into two "communi-
ties": grades E-1 through E-5 (junior enlisted), and grades E-6 through E-9 (staff non-
commissioned officers), in recognition of the differences between them in career orien-
tation, social interaction, job responsibility, and mobility within the command structure.
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not apply to trials by court-martial.3 The decisions have resulted in an
implied exception to the jury right similar to the express exception in
the Fifth Amendment which excludes the right to grand jury indictment
in the military.4 Exhaustive historical analyses conclude that the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial was never intended to apply to the
military.5
Since courts-martial are not Article II cQurts, what personal
rights are constitutionally protected under Congress' power to "make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces"?7 Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Military Appeals
have held that the rights available in the military are not merely those
which are created by statute. For example, in a series of decisions
since 1951, every right enumerated in the Sixth Amendment, other
than the right to jury trial, has been held to apply to the armed forces
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.' Under its
Article I power, Congress has embodied most of the Bill of Rights in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.9 Finally, by authority delegated
3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (dictum); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (866) (dictum).
4. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 40 (1942).
The Court's reasoning has been criticized as being based upon inadequate historical
analysis of the right to trial by jury in courts-martial and the framers' intent. See Rem-
cho, Military Juries: Constitutional Analysis and the Need for Reform, 47 IND. L.J. 193,
200-07 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Remcho].
5. See Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 71 HAv. L. Rnv. 293, 304 (1957). Henderson concludes, however, that with
the exception of the rights to petit and grand juries and the right to bail, the original
intent of the framers was that the Bill of Rights would apply to the military. Id. at
324; cf. Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice 11, 72
H v. L. REv. 266, 294 (1958), concluding that none of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights were intended to apply to the military. But see Van Loan, The Jury, The Court-
Martial, and the Constitution, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 412-13 n.254 (1972), suggest-
ing that the omission of an exception clause from the Sixth Amendment similar to that
contained in the Fifth Amendment ("No person shall be held to answer for a. . . crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces. . . .") was nothing more than a historical accident.
6. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
8. E.g., United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956) (public
trial); United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) (Miranda
warnings); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (con-
frontation); United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964) (com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33
C.M.R. 411 (1963) (counsel); cf. United States v. Marshall, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 47
C.M.R. 409 (1973); United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971)
(speedy trial).
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. See UCMJ arts.
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by Congress,'0 the president has implemented procedural rules for
courts-martial in the Manual for Courts-Martial.", It can be generally
stated that members of the armed forces are now effectively entitled
to all guarantees of the Bill of Rights 2 except the right to bail, the
right to grand jury indictment, and the right to trial by an impartial
jury.
There are sound reasons for excluding the right to bail and the
right to grand jury indictment. The right to bail has historically been
unavailable,' 3 and the recent mandates for speedy trial, much more
severe than those required in civilian courts, as a practical matter make
the protections inherent in the right to bail unnecessary.' 4  The Fifth
Amendment specifically excludes the right to grand jury indictment.
However, even though grand juries are not required by the Constitu-
tion, a more extensive right is provided by statute in the military.
Before trial by general court-martial, a hearing must be conducted dur-
ing which the accused has the right to be represented by counsel and
the right to cross-examine witnesses.',5 After the hearing, a judge
16, 27, 31, 32, 44, 46, 55, 63(b), 70; 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 827, 831, 832, 844, 846, 855
863(b) 870 (1970).
10. UCMJ art. 36; 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev.
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM]. See MCM 6(c), 48(a), 52-58, 115(a), 117,
145, 152.
12. Indeed, the rights may be more extensive, see United States v. Tempia, 16
U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967) (Miranda warnings broadened by UCMJ art.
31), or narrower, United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 45 C.M.R. 338 (1972)
(First Amendment free speech protection limited by military necessity), than those af-
forded civilians. The extent of application is different because of the peculiarities of
the military community, the need for discipline, and the military mission. For a com-
parison of military and civilian constitutional rights, see generally Sherman, The Civil-
ianizatlon of Military Law', 22 MArNE L. REV. 3 (1970); Moyer, Procedural Rights of
the Military Accused; Advantages Over a Civilian Defendant, 22 MAINE L. Rnv. 105
(1970).
13. See Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Under-
standing, 71 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1957).
14. See United States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971), where
the Court of Military Appeals established a presumption of the lack of speedy trial,
when pretrial confinement exceeds ninety days; cf. United States v. Marshall, 22
U.S.C.M.A. 431, 47 C.M.R. 409 (1973) (presumption rebuttable only by a showing of
extraordinary circumstances). See generally Note, The Military Court System Takes
the Initiative With the Issue of Speedy Trial, 3 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 292 (1974).
Additional protections are afforded the military accused by UCMJ arts. 10, 33, and
98; 10 U.S.C. §§ 810, 833, 898 (1970). See also MCM 20 (c): "Confinement will
not be imposed pending trial unless deemed necessary to insure the presence of the ac-
cused at trial or because of the seriousness of the offense charged." In civilian courts,
the speedy trial guarantee is not so strictly construed. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514 (1972) (right to speedy trial not denied despite five year delay between arrest
and trial).
15. UCMJ art. 32; 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970).
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advocate must review the transcript and recommend a course of action
to the convening authority.1' A similar right is not available prior to
trial by special court-martial,"" but .the punishment which may be
imposed by such a court is much less severe.18
This note will examine the right to "trial by an impartial jury" as
implemented by statute and judicial decisions under the doctrine of mil-
itary due process, and the extent of the right of a lower-ranking enlisted
accused to a jury selected, in part, from his lower-ranking peers. The
interpretation of military due process will be re-examined, and an
alternative equal protection argument suggested. Finally, three vehi-
cles which can reform present procedures in the absence of judical ac-
tion will be proposed.
Present Rights To Jury Trial And
The Effect Of Command Influence
Statutory Rights under the UCMJ
While the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury in trials by
court-martial, the right has been effectively granted by article 16 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.' 9  The court-martial panel is
often referred to as a "jury." However, -the panel differs significantly
from a civilian jury in the process of selecting members and the criteria
for their selection.20
First, and perhaps the most important of the military require-
ments, is that an accused will not be tried by anyone junior to him in
16. UCMJ art. 34; 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1970). In Talbot v. United States ex rel.
Toth, 215 F.2d 22, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), the court of appeals stated that articles
32 and 34 met the essentials of due process in that phase of the proceedings. While
recognizing that grand jury indictment is not constitutionally required in trials by court-
martial, the court stated that these articles afforded as much protection to the accused
as do the requirements of grand jury indictment in civilian trials.
17. UCMJ art. 16; 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970).
18. There are three forms of courts-martial provided by the UCMJ. A general
court-martial may impose any penalty authorized under the code, including the death
penalty. UCMJ art. 18; 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1970). A special court-martial may adjudge
a maximum of six months' confinement, plus reduction and forfeitures of pay and, if
certain requirements are met, a bad conduct discharge. UCMJ art. 19; 10 U.S.C. § 819
(1970). A summary court-martial may impose only relatively minor punishments,
UCMJ art. 20; 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970), and will not be considered in this note.
19. See UCMJ art. 16; 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970). A general court-martial consists
of a military judge and not less than five members. A special court-martial usually con-
sists of a military judge and not less than three members. In either case, the accused
may request trial by military judge alone.
20. The panel also differs in function. It acts as the finder of fact, but also im-
poses sentence by two-thirds vote in noncapital offenses (unanimous vote in capital of-
fenses). UCMJ art. 52; 10 U.S.C. § 852 (1970).
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rank or grade, unless unavoidable. 21 This is necessary because a court-
martial is an instrument of discipline as well as a forum for justice.22
The vertical class structure of the military exists, rightfully so, to insure
discipline and obedience. In the trial of offenses against discipline or
authority, court-martial proceedings necessarily require that punish-
ment be adjudged by the superiors of the accused.23 In such a case,
a lower-ranking member cannot be considered a "peer" of the higher
ranking accused on trial for a purely "military" offense. 24
Second, the selection process under article 25 of the UCMJ
requires the convening authority to select those court members who,
in his opinion, are "best qualified for the duty by reason of age, educa-
tion, training, experience, length of service, and judicial tempera-
ment. '20  This requirement has caused the most litigation and dispute
regarding the fairness of the court-martial panel, and is the primary
example of "lawful" command influence.20
The language of article 25 is vague, and grants wide discretion
in the selection of court members. Absent a showing of intentional
disregard of article 25 criteria, the convening authority's discretion is
virtually unlimited. 7  As a result, lower-ranking enlisted personnel
have been systematically excluded from court-martial panels, 28 al-
21. UCMJ art. 25(d)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(1) (1970).
22. The "duality" of the court-martial has been the cause of the denial of funda-
mental trial rights to the military accused. However, even the highest military com-
manders have recognized that the functions of the court-martial are inseparable: "A
military trial should not have a dual function as an instrument of discipline and as an
instrument of justice. It should be an instrument of justice and in fulfilling this func-
tion, it will promote discipline." Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Commander's
Viewpoint, 10 AM. CuM. L. REv. 5, 8 (1971). For a comparison of views on the "jus-
tice" vs. "discipline" dichotomy, see generally H. MovER, JUSTICE AND THE MmrrTAy,
§ 1-150 (1972) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE AND THE MILITARY].
23. See Brookshire, Juror Selection Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
Fact and Fiction, 58 Mi.. L. REv. 71, 104 n.1 10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Brookshire].
But see Remcho, supra note 4, at 226.
24. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text infra.
25. UCMJ art. 25(d)(2); 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1970). The convening author-
ity is that officer given the power to create a court-martial for the trial of an offense
and to refer charges to the court convened. UCMJ arts. 22-24; 10 U.S.C. H8 822-824
(1970) (designation of commanders qualified as convening authority). He also has ex-
tensive powers of appellate review in addition to his powers of selecting the members
of the court. UCMJ arts. 60-64; 10 U.S.C. H§ 860-864 (1970) (appellate review);
UCMJ arts. 25-29; 10 U.S.C. H8 825-829 (1970) (selection of members).
26. See JUSTICE AND THE MILrrARY, supra note 22, §§ 3-112, 3-201. See text ac-
companying notes 34-40 infra.
27. See notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra.
28. See United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 36, 35 C.M.R. 3, 8 (1964).
(During the period 1959-1963, no enlisted man below grade E-4 had served on an Army
court-martial panel). Through 1972, very few lower-ranking enlisted men had served
on courts-martial in any service. Remcho, supra note 4, at 195-97.
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though, with the exception of the seniority requirement, rank was
not intended by Congress to be a factor in selection.29
Third, an enlisted accused tried by special or general court-martial
has three choices in the composition of his court. He may request trial
by military judge alone, and such a request is rarely refused.3 0  He may
request a court panel consisting of at least one-third enlisted member-
ship, which must be granted with few exceptions.31 Absent either
request, he will be tried by a panel of commissioned or warrant offi-
Current statistics indicate the scope of the problems confronted in this note:
Marine Corps
Air Force Army Navy
FY 73 FY 74 FY 73 FY 74 FY 73 FY 74*
Total General Courts-Martial 252 270 1,547 1,988 740 293
Number with full panel 129 116 486 542 195 84
Number with judge alone 123 154 1,061 1,446 545 209
Number panels with enlisted members 5 5 49 94 ** **
Number with members E-5 or below ** ** 41 81 ** **
Total Special Courts-Martial 2,217 2,557 809tt 1,270 10,188 5,942
Number with full panel 599 661 105 143 794 359
Number with judge alone 1,618 1,896 705 1,127 9,3945,583
Number panels with enlisted members 1*** 3*** 16 25 ** **
Number with members E-5 or below ** ** 16 25 ** **
* First half fiscal year 74
* Data not collected or not available
*** Special courts-martial resulting in an approved bad conduct discharge (Air Force:
237 in FY 73, 377 in FY 74).
tt Does not equal total of number with full panel and number with judge alone.
Letter from Col. W.L. Lewis, Chief, Military Justice Division, USAF, to author, Nov.
15, 1974; Letter from V.M. McElroy, Clerk of Court, USA, to author, Nov. 6, 1974;
Letter from Cdr. L.M. Farrell, Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (Military Jus-
tice), USN, to author, Nov. 8, 1974. (Letters on file in the offices of the HASTINGS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY.)
29. "Nothing in the Uniform Code expressly limits membership on a court-martial
to persons of a particular rank. On the contrary, notwithstanding the reference to the
selection of those 'best qualified,' Article 25 implies all ranks and grades are eligible for
appointment." United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 36, 35 C.M.R. 3, 8
(1964). However, the court noted that the criteria of article 25 bear a close relation
to seniority of rank. Id. at 40, 35 C.M.R. at 12.
30. UCMJ arts. 16(1)(B), 16(2)(C); 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1)(B), 816(2)(C)
(1970). Statistics indicate that most accused are tried by military judge alone. See note
28 supra; Brookshire, supra note 23, at 86-87.
Fear of the "blue-ribbon" panel or appointment of senior noncommissioned officers
where enlisted representation is requested may account in part for the disproportionate
number of trials by judge alone. For a tactical evaluation of request for trial by judge
alone, see Trial by Judge Alone-Danger?, 3 THE ADVOCATE 61 (1971).
31. UCMJ art. 25(c)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (1) (1970).
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cers."2 These "choices" have been criticized as illusory by several
writers. 3 Despite such criticism, absent an abuse of discretion by the
convening authority in the selection of members of the court, an
enlisted accused has more choice in the composition of his court than
has the civilian defendant.
Abuse of Discretion: Command Influence
Perhaps the greatest fear voiced and the deficiency most apparent
in the military justice process is the opportunity for command influ-
ence. 4  Since the commander has the responsibility for the discipline
and morale of his command, he will have a personal interest in the out-
come of any court-martial of one of his men. Vehement commentary
has been directed at the actual or possible abuse of power, particularly
in -the selection of court members.8 5 While there is potential for
unlawful command influence, it is submitted that actual abuses by the
convening authority are rare.
The opportunities for personally influencing the outcome of the
court-martial are curtailed by the selection procedures used in most
large commands. Court members are selected from a master list by
the judge advocate or a member of the convening authority's staff and
submitted to the convening authority for approval. 36 Although per-
sonal selection is apparently required by article 25, the convening
32. UCMJ arts. 25(a), 25(b); 10 U.S.C. §§ 825(a), 825(b) (1970).
33. See, e.g., Sherman, Justice in the Military, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND:
JUSTICE AND DlSCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY 21, 48 (J. Finn ed. 1971); Remcho, supra note
4, at 196-97. The "illusory" nature of the choice is based on the assertion that the con-
vening authority usually appoints senior noncommissioned officers to the court panel
when enlisted representation is requested by the accused. Such members often are more
severe in their judgments than an all-officer court.
34. See, e.g., Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need for Legislative
Reform, 10 AM. Caim. L. Rnv. 9 (1971); JUSTICE AND THE MmITARY, supra note 22,
§§ 2-590, 3-111, 3-112, 3-400; Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military
Law, 10 AM. CRiM. L. Rlv. 25 (1971).
35. See Comment, Stacked Juries: A Problem of Military Injustice, 11 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 362 (1971).
36. Brookshire, supra note 23, at 91, 114 (app. B). "[A] convening authority may
shape the composition of a jury panel in many ways short of the heavy-handed method
of naming an obviously biased panel .... [HI]owever, the existence of a broad com-
mand discretion does not prove that it is invariably exercised. Indeed, many factors sug-
gest that convening authorities commonly do not exercise the full measure of their law-
ful prerogatives, much less exceed them. Many commanders as a matter of practice
have nothing to do with the mechanics of selecting court members." JUSTICE AND THE
MILITARY, supra note 22, § 3-201, at 725. Unlawful command influence is proscribed
by article 37 of the code, and is punishable under article 98 of the code. However,
as far as the author can determine, there has never been a court-martial for an article
98 offense. See Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Op-
eration and Future, 55 MiL. L. REv. 39, 69 n.160 (1972).
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authority is rarely involved in the process except for the final selection.
This procedure has been approved by the Court of Military Appeals.3
Finally, perhaps in a backhanded view of the problem, the number of
courts-martial sitting with a full panel is quite small in relation to the
number of courts convenedY s
Although the extent of actual command influence and active inter-
ference with the court-martial process is small, it is well established that
the mere appearance of impropriety or unfairness may undermine con-
fidence in the judicial system, and provide a basis for constitutional
attack.39 Unfortunately, the Court of Military Appeals has required
much more than an "appearance of unfairness" to reverse a court-
martial conviction by a "blue ribbon" panel consisting of high ranking
members. 40 The reluctance of the court to do so results from a balance
in favor of the requirements of military necessity over those of military
due process.
History of Military Due Process in a Judicial Setting
The concept of "military due process" was developed by the Court
of Military Appeals to insure fundamental fairness to the accused in
trials by court-martial under the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment. In United States v. Clay,41 it was unclear whether the court
defined military due process in terms of constitutional rights or upon
purely statutory rights created by the Uniform Code. The court clearly
established a constitutional right in United States v. Jacoby, stating:
[T]he protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are ex-
pressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to
members of our armed forces.42
After Jacoby, Chief Judge Quinn defined the concept in terms of both
constitutional and statutory rights:
37. See United States v. Kemp, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973); cf.
United States v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955) (convening authority
must still ratify the final nominations).
38. See note 28 supra. This remains true although trials by military judge alone
result in higher conviction rates and more severe sentences than do those sitting with
a full panel. JUTIscE AND TnE MILrrARY, supra note 22, § 2-609, at 533.
39. "Faith in the courts and in the jury system must be maintained . .. . That
faith can be sustained only by keeping our judicial proceedings from the suspicion of
wrong. The question is, not whether any actual wrong resulted . . . but whether
[an action] created a condition from which prejudice might arise or from which the gen-
eral public would suspect that the jury might be influenced to reach a verdict on the
ground of bias or prejudice." Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70, 77 (6th Cir. 1940).
40. See notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra.
41. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
42. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960).
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It can be said, therefore, that military due process begins with the
basic rights and privileges defined in the federal constitution. It
does not stop there. The letter and the background of the Uniform
Code add their weighty demands to the requirements of a fair trial.
Military due process is, thus, not synonymous with federal civilian
due process. It is basically that, but something more, and some-
thing different. 43
The "something more and something different" has become an
amorphous concept of "military necessity," which emphasizes the court-
martial as an instrument of discipline. The fundamental fairness
required by due process is thus balanced in trials by court-martial with
the military necessity for discipline.44 The Supreme Court has also
recognized these countervailing factors, most recently in Parker v.
Levy:
The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible out-
side it.4 5
The military necessity for discipline and obedience has been cited time
and again as justification for denial of fundamental rights.
Prior to the creation of the Court of Military Appeals in 1951,46
members of the armed forces had few protections, since the argument
of military necessity had been accepted by the Supreme Court with
little inquiry. 47 Until Burns v. Wilson,4" the Court had refused to
review convictions by courts-martial for lack of jurisdiction resulting
from alleged constitutional deprivations. This "hands-off" attitude has
strong historical support,49 and the Court is still prohibited from review-
ing courts-martial convictions except by appeal of habeas corpus
petitions from the federal courts." The Supreme Court has therefore
43. Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Military Due Process,
35 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 225, 232 (1961).
44. Cf., United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 569-71, 45 C.M.R. 338, 343
45 (1972) (Military necessity for discipline dictates the extent of First Amendment
rights to free expression).
45. 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).
46. Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, art. 67, 64 Stat. 107, as amended 10 U.S.C.
§ 867 (1970).
47. See Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 181, 186-
88 (1962).
48. 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality opinion).
49. "The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the im-
pact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.
Many of the problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the problems with
which the judiciary is trained to deal." Warren, supra note 47, at 187. See Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
50. The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to its holding in Ex parte Vallan-
digham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863), that it has no power to review by certiorari the
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played an intermittent role in the development of constitutional law as
applied to military justice. The concept of military due process has been
developed almost entirely by the Court of Military Appeals.
Constitutional Deprivations under the UCMJ
The court-martial system arguably results in due process and equal
protection violations in the jury selection process. The excessive dis-
cretion granted the convening authority under article 25 in the
selection of court members may result in a court panel which has the
appearance of being fundamentally unfair. In addition, an enlisted
accused of lower rank is deprived of the equal protection of the laws
under article 25 in three ways. First, an officer enjoys the right to
be tried by his fellow officers, 51 while an enlisted accused is entitled
to only one-third enlisted personnel on his panel,52 and these members
are likely to be senior enlisted personnel who comprise a different peer
group than the accused. 3 Second, the argument may be advanced on
the basis that Congress has designed one selection procedure for
civilians under the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,"
which provides for the random selection of jurors,55 while members of
the armed forces are discriminated against as a class under article 25
for no compelling reason. Third, there are significant interservice and
intraservice variations in the application of the article 25 selection
criteria.5 6
Discretion v. Due Process
Due Process Does an "A bout Face"
The Supreme Court has noted that neither a twelve-member
jury57 nor a unanimous verdict58 is constitutionally required under the
decisions of courts-martial. See UCMJ arts. 59-76; 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-876 (1970) (pres-
ent military appellate procedure).
This shortcoming in the military appellate process has been the subject of proposed
legislation. See, e.g., S. 987, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1259 (1973) (empowering the Su-
preme Court to issue writs of certiorari to the Court of Military Appeals). For discus-
sion and critique of the present procedures, Yee Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971:
The Need for Legislation Reform, 10 AM. CiuM. L. Rnv. 9, 21-23 (1971).
51. Cf. UCMJ, art. 25(d)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(1) (1970).
52. UCMJ, art. 25(c)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 825 (c) (1) (1970).
53. See JusTIcE AND THE MmITARY, supra note 22, § 2-598.
54. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1970).
55. "It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled
to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from
a fair cross section of the community .... ." Id. § 1861.
56. See notes 106-112 and accompanying text infra.
57. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
58. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (pluarlity opinion): cf. John-
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Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments in state criminal trials. Further-
more, a jury is required only in those criminal cases where more than
six months' confinement may be imposed.59 Thus, of all constituencies
possible in a court-martial, only the three-man panel of a special court-
martial authorized to award a bad-conduct discharge would not meet
the present requirements of constitutional due process. 60
While the resulting civilian jury is not required to reflect a com-
munity cross-section, selection procedures may not arbitrarily discrim-
inate to exclude an identifiable class of potential jurors.6 Systematic
exclusion from consideration on the basis of occupation 2 or race6 3 has
been held to be an unconstitutional deprivation of due process.
Conceding that the various ranks within the military are identifi-
able groups, does de facto exclusion from a court-martial panel on the
basis of rank constitute a denial of due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment? The Court of Military Appeals has held that it does
not.64 Other rights have been granted which conceivably pose greater
threats to discipline and are more inconvenient to the military forces,0 5
but the right to a fairly selected panel has been uniformly denied by
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). In Johnson, reviewing a state case decided be-
fore the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee was applied to the states in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court indicated that a unanimous verdict by a five-person
jury would meet the Fourteenth Amendment requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection. Id. at 363-65.
In a Navy Court of Military Review decision, the two-thirds voting procedure under
article 52 met the "substantial majority" test of Johnson. United States v. Murray, 48
C.M.R. 331, 333 (NCMR 1973).
59. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality opinion).
60. A bad conduct discharge is viewed as so punitive that up to one year of con-
finement may be substituted on rehearing by a general court-martial. Remcho, supra
note 4, at 217 n.125. It is doubtful whether a three-member "jury" authorized to convict
and impose punishment by a two-thirds vote would be considered a "constitutional" jury.
61. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
62. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
63. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (persons of Mexican descent);
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (negroes); cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct.
692 (1975) (systematic exclusion of women from jury panels held unconstitutional un-
der the Sixth Amendment).
64. See notes 66-74 and accompanying text infra.
65. See, e.g., MCM, supra note 11, 152, which restricts the commander's author-
ity to conduct searches without probable cause. Commanders are often frustrated in
their desire to search entire barracks seeking to recover stolen government property,
stolen personal property, or contraband. In the author's experience, evidence seized in
such unannounced "health and comfort" inspections is often excluded in courts-martial.
Cf. Carlson v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973), where the commander's
discretion to curtail protest activities which he deemed injurious to the morale of his
command was restricted as conflicting with the First Amendment rights of the offenders.
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the Court of Military Appeals, despite flagrant examples of discrimina-
tory selection procedures.
In United States v. Crawford,66 the court appeared prepared to
reverse a conviction coming from a stacked court, stating: "Constitu-
tional due process includes the right to be treated equally with all other
accused in the selection of impartial triers of the facts. ' '67  However,
the court upheld the conviction by a panel consisting of one-third senior
noncommissioned officers, since the selection procedure was "directly
and reasonably calculated to obtain persons with the qualifications
prescribed by [article 25] . "8... 68 The test to be applied in evaluat-
ing allegations of discriminatory selection based upon rank was stated
by Chief Judge Quinn:
What we have said about the original understanding of the Code's
enlisted membership provision indicates that a method of selection
which disregards individual qualification and deliberately and
systematically excludes all enlisted persons of the lower ranks is
contrary to the Uniform Code.69
In United States v. Kemp,70 the court held that not only is the
Sixth Amendment inapplicable to the military, but also the "accom-
panying considerations of constitutional means by which juries may be
selected has no application to the appointment of members of courts-
martial." 71 The court held that appointment of members is governed
by article 25 of the Uniform Code, and refused to accept the argument
that the selection process created a constitutional deprivation of due
process of law. The convening authority had selected court members
from a list of nominees comprised of lieutenant colonels, majors, and
captains. The court approved the procedure and stated that "no con-
trolling weight was given to the factor of grade by any of [the conven-
ing authority's] subordinates." 72 The court distinguished United States
v. Greene,73 where the announced command policy was to place only
colonels and lieutenant colonels on the panel. Finally, the court recog-
nized the merits of a random selection procedure, but also the peculiar
requirements of the military justice system, and left to Congress the
66. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
67. Id. at 34, 35 C.M.R. at 6.
68. Id. at 40, 35 C.M.R. at 12.
69. Id. at 37-38, 35 C.M.R. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
70. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 152, 46 C.M.R. 152 (1973).
71. Id. at 154, 46 C.M.R. at 154.
72. Id. at 155, 46 C.M.R. at 155.
73. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 232, 43 C.M.R. 72 (1970). A panel which on its face shows
an overwhelming taint of unfairness and has the appearance of favoritism to the govern-
ment will be invalidated. See United States v. Hedges, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 642, 29 C.M.R.
458 (1960) (seven of nine members had duties involving law enforcement and crime
control).
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burden of implementing the random selection procedure requested by
the appellant.
The effect of Crawford, Kemp and Greene appears to be that mil-
itary due process permits de facto exclusion of lower ranking enlisted
personnel from court-martial panels. So long as the convening author-
ity "considers" all personnel and then decides to exclude the lower
ranks as not meeting the criteria of article 25, fairness is served. As
one authority observes, absent an announced command policy of
exclusion (Greene) or a court that is facially weighted in favor of the
government (Hedges), the present procedures will withstand constitu-
tional attack based upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.7
4
Fairness v. Necessity: Re-evaluation
The military argues that a representative selection procedure
would result in an increased acquittal rate and more lenient sentences,
thereby undermining military discipline. The advocates of a represen-
tative procedure cite the increasing responsibility and educational level
of lower-ranking enlisted personnel.76  Neither side has offered statis-
tics or other proof to support the hypothetical effects of junior enlisted
personnel sitting on court-martial panels. However, it is known that
the military would have little economic or administrative difficulty in
implementing representative procedures, either by random selection or
by allowing the convening authority to select junior enlisted members
personally.76  It may also be argued that such procedures would
improve enlisted morale, and reduce the number of disciplinary
infractions.
There are also no statistics available comparing the severity of
sentences and conviction rates of courts where panels consist of officers
and senior noncommissioned officers with panels including members
from the lower ranks. Until recently, lower ranking enlisted personnel
have rarely been allowed on court-martial panels.7 7  Absent any clear
demonstration of military necessity, the appearance of fairness resulting
from a representative panel should be required by military due process
in the trial of "military crimes""8 and by constitutional due process in
74. JUSTICE AND THm MrrARy, supra note 22, § 2-596.
75. E.g., Sherman, Justice in the Military, in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND: JUSTICE
AND DISCIPLINE IN TE MILITARY 21, 48-50 (J. Finn ed. 1971); JUSTICE AND THE MILI-
TARY, supra note 22, § 2-598, at 526-27. See also Brookshire, supra note 23, at 88-91,
indicating that the majority of the convening authorities surveyed see no inherent prob-
lem in assigning junior enlisted men to courts-martial.
76. See, e.g., Brookshire, supra note 23, at 94-106.
77. See note 28 supra.
78. "Military" crimes are those which historically have been tried by courts-martial
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the trial of "true crimes. '7 9 ,
It can be argued that "military crimes" are not crimes at all within
the meaning of Article lII and the Sixth Amendment, and that constitu-
tional due process requirements would therefore not apply."" The
majority of offenses tried by court-martial are such crimes."' They are
primarily offenses against command and obedience, and their volume
and peculiarities of evidence would make them inappropriate for trial
in civilian courts. Yet there is no reason to believe that a private on
trial for unauthorized absence will not be disciplined by a court that
empanels corporals among its enlisted members.
The due process argument becomes stronger in a court-martial for
a "true crime." Much more than an "appearance of fairness" is
involved. In such a case, constitutional due process should require a
panel free from any possible command influence under article 25.
and are primarily disciplinary offenses with no counterpart in civilian life. See UCMJ,
arts. 85-87; 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-887 (1970) (absence offenses); UCMJ arts. 88-92, 117;
10 U.S.C. §§ 888-892, 917 (1970) (disrespect and disobedience of superiors); UCMJ
arts. 94, 99, 100, 101, 104-106, 113; 10 U.S.C. §§ 894, 899, 900, 901, 904-906, 913
(1970) ("combat related" offenses).
79. "True" crimes may have a military element. See, e.g., UCMJ art 90(1); 10
U.S.C. § 890(1) (1970) (assault on a superior officer). But true crimes comprise a
category of offenses historically not tried by courts-martial. See UCMJ arts. 118-131;
10 U.S.C. §§ 918-931 (1970) (murder, manslaughter, rape, larceny, robbery, forgery,
uttering, maiming, sodomy, arson, extortion, assault, burglary, housebreaking, and per-
jury).
80. This argument would apply only to those offenses tried by a special court-mar-
tial not authorized to award a bad conduct discharge, since the Supreme Court has classi-
fied "offenses" as "crimes" or "petty offenses" on the basis of the punishment which
may be imposed, and not on the nature of the offense. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970). But see United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964):
"Courts-martial are criminal prosecutions, and those constitutional protections and rights
which the history and text of the Constitution do not plainly deny to military accused
are preserved to them in the service." Id. at 34, 35 C.M.R. at 6.
81. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF MILITARY JUSTICE IN TIM ARMED FoRcE§, at 197-98 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as DOD REP.]. The study classified offenses into five major categories, id. at 183-84,
and collected data from all services during the period June 5-July 5, 1972, concerning
the number of offenses within each category tried by courts-martial within the period.
The results were as follows:
Category I -Major military or civilian crimes 694
(UCMJ arts. 80-81, 107-109, 115, 118-132)
Category II -Drug Related Offenses 209
(UCMJ art. 134)
Category II-Confrontation or Status Offenses 413
(UCMJ arts. 89-92, 95, 116, 117)
Category IV-Other military or civilian offenses 114
(drunk and disorderly, uniform viola-
tions, false I.D., etc.)
Category V -Unauthorized Absence 731
(UCMJ arts. 85-87)
Id. at 208-212.
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The military disciplinary interest is weaker when a court-martial tries
an accused for an offense which does not affect command authority.
The Supreme Court recognized this problem in O'Callahan v. Parker,"1'
by requiring the offense to be "service connected", but in practice the
connection may be found in any number of situations. 83 In such trials,
the court-martial panel becomes a jury in the true sense, and should
be selected as is the jury for a criminal trial. Despite the recommenda-
tions of some critics, 4 such crimes do not require trial by a civilian
court and jury to assure fairness. A court-martial is not inherently
more "unfair" than a civilian court.8 5 However, the jury selection
process is one area in which court-martial procedure does not provide
the safeguards of a civilian court.
Since any serious crime would be tried before a general court-
martial, a representative selection procedure would meet the require-
ments of both military due process and constitutional due process.
Furthermore, since such crimes are not offenses against discipline, the
requirement of seniority of the panel would not apply.
Breaking New Ground
Several procedures would meet the requirements of military due
process and constitutional due process, while imposing a minimal
burden on the military.8 6 Command discretion could be maintained
under article 25 as to military crimes, and a random selection pro-
cedure established, regardless of rank, for the trial of true crimes. A
random selection procedure could be implemented in the trial of both
types of offenses, maintaining the seniority requirement. Alterna-
tively, military jurisdiction over serious crimes could be eliminated
entirely, and representative selection required for the trial of military
82. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (sufficient service con-
nection when all essential acts of an offense are committed on a military installation);
Rainville v. Lee, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 47 C.M.R. 554 (1973) (off-base sale of drugs by
one military member to another sufficient service connection); United States v. Rego,
19 U.S.C.M.A. 9, 41 C.M.R. 9 (1969) (jurisdiction established when the essential act
is committed off-base, since theft from other soldiers is peculiarly a military crime).
For discussion of the after-effects of the O'Callahan decision, see Rice, O'Callahan v.
Parker: Court-Martial Jurisdiction, "Service Connection," Confusion, and the Service-
man, 51 MIL. L. REV. 41 (1971).
84. E.g., Fuchsberg, Command Influence on Military Justice, 7 TRiL 36 (Jan.-
Feb., 1971); Hatfield, Civil Safeguards for the Military, 7 TIAL 43, 44 (Sept.-Oct.,
1971). But see 119 CONG. REc. S3144 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1973) (remarks of Senator
Bayh).
85. See notes 8, 12, 14-16 supra.
86. See, e.g., Brookshire, supra note 23, at 94-106; Remcho, supra note 4, at 223-
29; Van Sant, Trial by Jury of Military Peers, 15 JAG L. REv. 185, 187-89 (1974) (pro.
posed random selection procedures).
Spring 19751 ILIARY DUE PROCESS
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
offenses. An extreme solution would remove all court-martial author-
ity from the military and try all offenses in civilian courts.87 The latter
solution should not be seriously considered, since the administrative
burden on the federal courts would be immense, and it is questionable
whether the trial of "military" crimes should be entrusted to a civilian
jury that has no understanding of the nature of such offenses and the
reasons for creating them.
Either military or constitutional due process should require a
court-martial panel that is representative of the military community,
consonant with the requirements of seniority in the trial of military of-
fenses, absent a showing of substantial interference with military
discipline. Article 25 does not comprehend exclusion of broad classes
of enlisted ranks, yet such de facto exclusion has uniformly occurred,
and is presently sanctioned by the Court of Military Appeals.
While the due process arguments appear to have been settled by
the decision in Kemp, no panel selection cases have been argued on
the basis of an asserted denial of the equal protection of the law. There
is no doctrine of "military" equal protection, since the Court of Military
Appeals has not had occasion to rely on such analysis in reaching its
decisions. However, such analysis ought to be applied to the current
court-martial panel selection procedures which are protected under
article 25.
Equal Protection Throughout the Ranks
The equal protection argument has only recently been suggested
in challenging the jurisdiction of courts-martial over offenses resulting
in infringement of First Amendment rights.88  A constitutional attack
on military jury selection based upon the implied equal protection
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment s9 may be advanced by analogy on
three separate grounds. First, federal law provides separate standards
for selection of military and civilian juries. Second, article 25 provides
for officer and noncommissioned officer representation on a court-
martial panel, and denies it to a lower-ranking enlisted accused.
Third, the vague selection criteria of article 25 result in invidious dis-
crimination against lower-ranking enlisted personnel between service
branches and organizations within the same service.
87. West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 151-56 (1970). "mhe only concession necessary or desirable to
effect discipline within the entire military judicial process, is that of signing charges
against offenders of military law.. .. All remaining functions within the court-martial
process, however, should be civilian operated and controlled." Id. at 154. West
would, however, retain military juries for the trial of military offenses in civilian courts
to prevent civilian prejudice. Id. at 154-55.
88. See notes 97-102 and accompanying text infra.
89. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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Civilian v. Military: Conflict in Federal Standards
When the jury selection provisions of article 25 and the Federal
Jury Selection and Service Act are compared, there appears to be de
jure discrimination against members of the armed forces as a class.
The criteria of article 25 also result in invidious discrimination against
lower-ranking enlisted personnel. However, neither the classification
as "military" nor "enlisted" has been held to be suspect by the Supreme
Court. The Court has also refused to declare that the random selection
of juries from a cross-section of the community is a fundamental right.90
Military discipline may be considered a "compelling governmental
interest." However, even if the statutes create neither a suspect classi-
fication nor violate a fundamental interest,91 there is still no demon-
strable rational relation between the power of the convening authority
to select a court-martial panel and military discipline.92
90. The right to a jury trial in state criminal trials was held "fundamental" for
the first time by the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and
thus guaranteed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However,
random selection of juries is not yet required as an element of fundamental fairness. See
Brookshire, supra note 23, at 78-80, 82-84. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692
(1975), the Court held "the fair cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment," id. at 697-98, and that this requirement was
violated by the systematic exclusion of women from jury service. The Court stated that
"[tihe right to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds. There
must be weightier reasons if a distinctive class representing 537 of the eligible jurors
is for all practical purposes to be excluded from jury service." Id. at 699-700
(emphasis added).
The Court in Taylor distinguished Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), where such
exclusion was held not to violate due process and equal protection standards, as being
decided prior to Duncan's application of the Sixth Amendment to the states. The anom-
alous position of requiring a jury drawn from a fair cross-section for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment but not as required by the "fundamental fairness" of due process was
criticized by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 702-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. The Court's equal protection analysis is based upon the nature of the interest
violated. If the discrimination affects a "fundamental interest" or is based upon a "sus-
pect classification," "strict scrutiny" will be required to determine if there is a "compell-
ing governmental interest" to sustain the classification. If neither a fundamental interest
nor a suspect classification is involved, minimal scrutiny will be applied to determine
if there is a "rational relationship" between the discriminatory conduct and a legitimate
governmental interest. Cf. San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). For a discussion of the Court's shifting views of proper equal protection analy-
sis, see Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
92. Senator Hatfield suggests an inverse correlation and states that "[t]here is a
definite positive correlation between the degree of civilianization and the decreased prob-
lems of maintaining discipline," Hatfield, Civil Safeguards for the Military, 7 TRIAL 43
(Sept.-Oct., 1971). In a survey of career Army officers, 62.7 percent of the officers
responding believed that there would be no appreciable effect on discipline by requiring
the appointment of court members by someone other than the convening authority, and
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It is arguable that the maintenance of discipline requires the selec-
tion of members by the convening authority for the trial of purely mili-
tary offenses. In such cases the court-martial is, in reality, an
instrument of discipline. However, in the trial of serious crimes, there
is no justification for establishing two separate systems of jury selection.
Since Congress grants the right to a five-person panel in trials by
general courts-martial,93 the selection procedure should, at the very
least, provide for prohibition against de facto exclusion of lower-
ranking enlisted personnel.
Officer v. Enlisted Rights under Article 25
An officer has the right to be tried by a court-martial panel no
member of which will be junior to him in rank. He is thus tried by
his peer group.94  Similarly, should a noncommissioned officer request
enlisted representation, he will be tried by a panel representing at least
one-third of his peers.95
It is well established that noncommissioned officers constitute a
separate class within the military hierarchy, but they will comprise the
enlisted portion of the panel in the trial of a lower-ranking accused.90
Thus, all enlisted personnel are denied the protection afforded officers,
but lower-ranking enlisted personnel are also denied the one-third peer
representation granted to noncommissioned officers. Such de facto
exclusion is a direct result of the vague standards of article 25 and
the excessive discretion which it vests in the convening authority.
Interservice Variances
Recently, armed forces regulations affecting First Amendment
rights have been struck down by federal courts on equal protection
grounds, where the armed forces could demonstrate no military neces-
sity for their discriminatory application. These decisions may validly
be extended in evaluating discriminatory application of article 25
criteria.
that "the 'maintenance of discipline' is based on leadership and other considerations
which far outweigh the significance of who it is that details court members." Brook-
shire, supra note 23, at 90-91 n.73.
93. See UCMJ art. 16(1)(A); 10 U.S.C. § 816(L) (A) (1970).
94. See note 2 supra. It is arguable that a junior officer is not tried by his "peers"
when he is tried by field grade officers (grades 0-4 through 0-6). However, there is
little question that the educational and social "gap" between these classes is much
smaller than that between junior enlisted personnel and noncommissioned, commis-
sioned, and warrant officers.
95. The right accrues to the noncommissioned officer because of the seniority re-
quirements of UCMJ art. 25(d)(1); 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (1) (1970).
96. JUSTICE AND TSiE MILITARY, suprq note 22, § 2-59.. But see Army statistics,
sypra note 28,
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In Schreiber v. Wick,97 the Air Force was enjoined from enforcing
a regulation which prohibited the wearing of wigs by reservists, since
the Army allowed the wearing of wigs by personnel similarly situated.
The court noted the possibility of a violation of the equal protection
clause:
The conflicting policy between branches of the military service con-
cerning the grooming of reservists might well involve constitutional
problems of equal protection and due process.98
In Etheridge v. Schlesinger,9 the Navy permitted the wearing of
wigs for cosmetic purposes, but barred their use by reservists to cover
long hair during drill periods. The court cited Massie v. Henry,10° in
requiring the Navy to show the necessity of infringing on the freedom
of the reservists. Such necessity was not demonstrated in Etheridge,'
and the court held:
Accordingly, so long as the military chooses to recognize and not
curtail the rights of certain of its personnel it cannot arbitrarily cur-
tail the same rights of other personnel. Policies of that nature,
which are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment as applied to the states, are violative of the Due
Process Clause of the 5th Amendment as applied to the Federal
Government.1 02
While the equal protection argument was not presented in Carlson
v. Schlesinger,13 a vaguely worded Air Force regulation 4 proscribing
dissident and protest activities was declared an unconstitutional inter-
ference with First Amendment rights. The court characterized the
regulation as follows:
These guidelines [in AFR 35-15], in fact, provide no substantive
standards at all, and, as circumstances surrounding this litigation
97. 362 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
98. Id. at 194. The preliminary injunction granted was enlarged in Cullen v.
United States, 372 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
99. 362 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1973).
100. 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972). Massie established in civilian cases a balancing
test between governmental interests and personal interests under the First and Ninth
Amendments.
101. The Navy argued that such discretionary acts were not bounded by the Consti-
tution, and could not be interfered with by the court. The court summarily dismissed
the argument. 362 F. Supp. at 204.
102. Id.
103. 364 F. Supp. 626 (D.D.C. 1973).
104. AFR 35-15 attempted to regulate on-base possession and distribution of dissi-
dent and protest materials, by providing: "When prior approval for distribution or post-
ing is required, the commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline,
or morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with the accom-
plishment of a military mission would result. If such a determination is made, distribu-
tion or posting will be prohibited ... ." Id. at 629-30,
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so strikingly reveal, easily permit discriminatory and arbitrary
application.10 5
Interservice application of article 25 criteria shows similar vari-
ances. In the Army, lower-ranking enlisted personnel served on every
special court-martial where enlisted representation was requested in
fiscal years 1973 and 1974.106 In fiscal year 1973, eighty-four percent
of enlisted members serving on general courts-martial were in the
grade E-5 or below.'0 7  In fiscal year 1974, eighty-six percent were
in the lower grades.' 08 Similar statistics were not available for the
Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force.10 9 However, out of a total of 522
Air Force general courts-martial for the two years, only ten included
enlisted members on their panels,"10 while enlisted representation was
requested in four percent of Army general courts-martial."' Inter-
service variances in enlisted representation are even more pronounced
in trials by special court-martial.:" 2
Whether the courts will expand their limited application of equal
protection analysis to First Amendment rights and include the right to
equal -treatment in the selection process under article 25 remains to be
105. Id. at 633 (emphasis added). The Air Force also argued for a "hands-off'
policy because this was an area of military discretion. The court stated that "the mere
categorization of a duty as discretionary does not, in and of itself, foreclose judicial in-
quiry." Id. at 631 n.10. The increased scrutiny given by the federal courts to alleged
constitutional violations by the military has resulted from the decision in Kauffman v.
Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. den., 396 U.S. 1013,
reh. den., 397 U.S. 1031 (1970), where the court stated: "Mhe test of fairness requires
that military rulings on constitutional issues conform to Supreme Court standards, unless
it is shown that conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule." Id. at 997.
106. See note 28 supra.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Letter from Col. W.L. Lewis, Chief, Military Justice Dixision, USAF, to au-
thor, Nov. 15, 1974; Letter from Cdr. L.M. Farrell, Deputy Ass't Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, USN, to author, Nov. 8, 1974. (Letters on file in the offices of HAsNGs CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY.)
110. See note 28 supra.
111. Id. Out of a total of 3,535 general courts-martial in fiscal years 1973 and
1974, 143 accused requested enlisted representation.
112. Id. For fiscal years 1973 and 1974, the Army conducted 2,079 special courts-
martial resulting in an approved bad conduct discharge, with enlisted representation re-
quested in 41 (2.0%) courts. In the Air Force, there were 614 such courts, with only
four constituted with enlisted members. Note also the discrepancies between services
in the use of the court-martial sanction:
Courts-Martial per 1000 Service Strength Jan-June 1972
General Special Summary
Army .91 6.89 6.02
Navy .20 3.00 3.60
Air Force .13 1.49 .10
Marine Corps 1.80 14.50 14.50
1 DOD REP., supra note 81, at 11.
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seen. First Amendment rights have long been held to be fundamental,
while the right to a representative jury has only recently been
recognized. Military personnel in the ranks of E-1 to E-5 certainly are
in a "class" as easily identifiable as reservists. The argument's success
will depend upon whether or not article 25 can be shown to bear a
rational relation to the necessity of military discipline.
Judicial action is, however, only one means by which necessary
reform may be implemented. There are at least three other vehicles
available: (1) congressional action under article 25; (2) presidential
action under the powers delegated to him by article 36 of the UCMJ;
(3) action by the military itself.
Alternate Vehicles for Reform
Congressional Action
Proposals for the reform of the military justice system have been
advanced in the last three sessions of Congress.1 1 3  The most compre-
hensive are those sponsored by Senator Birch Bayh (D. Ind.)" 4 and
Senator Mark Hatfield (R. Ore.).'1 Both proposals include provisions
for the random selection of court-martial panels," 6 and remove virtu-
ally all control over the military justice process from the convening au-
thority.1 17  These proposals indicate an awareness in Congress of the
113. For a detailed discussion of the proposals before the 91st and 92d Congress,
see Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 AM. CRiM. L.
Rnv. 25 (1971). Substantially identical bills were introduced in the 93d Congress:
H.R. 291-292, 748, 1076, 4194, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (constitutional rights of
servicemen); H.R. 8196, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (independent court-martial com-
mand); H.R. 316, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (companion bill to S. 987).
114. S. 987, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill is identical with S. 1127, 921
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), discussed in Bayh, The Military Justice Act of 1971: The Need
for Legislative Reform, 10 AM. Caim. L. REv. 9 (1971). For discussion of the provi-
sions and effect of S. 987, see 119 CONG. REc. S3137 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1973) (remarks
of Senator Bayh).
115. S. 2202-2214, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). These bills are identical with S.
2171-2183, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), discussed in Hatfield, Civil Safeguards for the
Military, 7 TmtI&. 43 (Sept.-Oct., 1971).
116. S. 987, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 806a(e), 825(b) (1973); S. 2211, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
117. The proposals are greatly concerned with actual or apparent command influ-
ence. Senator Bayh and Hatfield propose to institute some form of a military judicial
"circuit" to remove the judicial process from the authority of the commander. Senator
Hatfield proposes to remove all jurisdiction over civilian type offenses from courts-mar-
tial. Hatfield, Civil Safeguards for the Military, 7 TRIAL 43, 44 (Sept.-Oct., 1971).
Senator Bayh believes that such offenses may be fairly tried by courts-martial if the pres-
ent system is reformed. 119 CONG. Rnc. S3144 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1973) (remarks of
Senator Bayh). Parallel reforms include provisions for Supreme Court review, abolishing
the summary court-martial, prohibition of trial by court-martial for an offense already
tried by a state court, and more strict procedures regulating pretrial confinement.
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image of the military justice system which prevails today: a system ex-
ists in which the potential for command influence pervades the process
from the referral of charges to review on appeal. At this date, how-
ever, none of the reform proposals have been enacted into law.
Presidential Action
The president has authority under article 36 of the UCMJ to pre-
scribe procedures for the conduct of courts-martial.11 His regulations,
however, may not be inconsistent with the Uniform Code. 119 The criti-
cal question is whether the president can amend paragraph 4(c) and
4(d) of the Manual for Courts-Martial to require the random selection
of jurors or, at least, representation by members of the lower ranks. 20
Would this be considered "procedural" and thus within the grant of au-
thority, or would such an amendment conflict with article 25? It
should be noted that the president has prescribed the rank of those offi-
cers who may act as summary courts-martial,' 21 although the UCM.
merely requires "one commissioned officer."' 2 2  The Court of Military
Appeals has previously invalidated provisions of the Manual as conflict-
ing with the Code, but in most of these cases the Manual had attempted
to create offenses which were not proscribed by the Code. 23
118. UCMJ art. 36(a); 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (1970).
119. "If a Manual provision deals with a rule of evidence or a procedural question
and does not conflict with the Constitution, other law, or other Manual provisions, it
is effective." United States v. Montgomery, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 35, 38, 42 C.M.R. 227, 230
(1970).
120. MCM, 4(c) states, in part:
"Rank of members.
An enlisted member [who has requested enlisted members] . .. may not be tried
by a court the membership of which does not include enlisted members in a number
comprising at least one-third of the total membership of the court ... ." MCM 4(d)
quotes verbatim the provisions of UCMJ art. 25(d) (2). Similarly. MCM 36(c) (2)
(a) might be amended to direct the convening authority to select from among the peers
of the enlisted accused, those who are "best qualified" under the article 25 criteria.
121. MCM I 4(c) states: "Whenever practicable, the senior member of a general
or special court-martial should be an officer whose grade is not below that of [0-3].
Whenever practicable, a summary court-martial should be an officer whose grade is
not below that of [0-3]." These requirements have not been invalidated by the Court
of Military Appeals as inconsistent with the UCMJ.
122. UCMJ art. 16(3); 10 U.S.C. § 816(3) (1970). There is also no rank or status
qualification for membership on general and special courts-martial. The Code, in terms,
requires only "members." UCMJ arts. 16(1)(A), 16(2)(A); 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1) (A)
(1970).
123. E.g., United States v. Landry, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 553, 34 C.M.R. 333 (1964) (im-
proper limitation on sentencing powers of the court-martial); United States v. Jenkins,
7 U.S.C.M.A. 261, 22 C.M.R. 51 (1956) ("fraudulent enlistment" under article 83 held
not to include induction as stated in the Manual).
[Vol. 2
Spring 1975] MILITARY DUE PROCESS
Military Action
Affirmative action has been taken by the military itself. The mili-
tary is extremely sensitive to civilian criticism, and this is responsible
in part for the "in-house" cleaning which is beginning within the armed
forces. It has been demonstrated that the military jury selection proc-
ess can conform to the American Bar Association standards124 without
hindering military discipline and without amendment of article 25.125
Several commands have experimented with random selection proce-
dures,'126 and current Army statistics reflect that representation of
lower-ranking enlisted personnel is increasing.
27
In addition to the voluntary efforts of individual commanders, the
Department of Defense completed a study of military justice 125 and in
1973 implemented several of the task force recommendations. 2 9
Court-martial panel selection was noted as one deficiency in the proc-
ess, 130 but no corrective action has been directed by the Department
of Defense. 1'
Conclusion
The accused in a court-martial has a statutory right to trial by jury.
An enlisted person has the right to request enlisted representation on
his court, but statistics indicate that few do so. No statistics are avail-
able concerning motives for avoiding the choice, but fear of an imbal-
anced and biased panel may play a part in the choice of trial by mii-
124. Brookshire, supra note 23, at 76 n.17 citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCiATION
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY, Approved Draft 1968. The ABA standards
provide for random selection from a community cross-section, and conform closely with
the procedures and policy of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.
125. Id. at 94-106.
126. Remcho, supra note 4, at 219-20; Van Sant, Trial by Jury of Military Peers,
15 JAG L. Rav. 185, 186 n.18 (1974).
127. Compare Army statistics, supra note 28, with United States v. Crawford, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 31, 36, 35 C.M.R. 3, 8 (1964).
128. 1-4 DOD REP., supra note 81.
129. SECP.ETARY OF DmFxNsE, MEMo TO SERVICE SECRETARiES, Jan. 11, 1973, cited
in 1 Mi.. L. REP. 4002 (Jan.-Feb. 1973).
130. 1 DOD REP., supra note 81, at 89-90, 125. The task force recommended im-
plementation of random selection procedures, in addition to numerous other reforms.
The task force report expressed the opinion that "[r]eference to the interests of the
country and the armed forces is not in any way incompatible with justice for the indi-
vidual. There can be no real and lasting discipline for American servicemen that does
not rest upon a fair and just administration of our law as it impacts upon the individual.
So no need is seen to consider the sacrifice of justice for the sake of discipline. The
two are, for American servicemen, inextricable, and the latter cannot exist without the
former." Id. at 13.
131. See note 129 supra. The secretary's memorandum noted that many of the task
force recommendations would require congressional action for implementation. Pre-
sumably, random selection of court-martial panels falls within this category.
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tary judge alone. Whether the panel which sits at the trial is in fact
unfair is not in issue, but appearance of unfairness can be remedied
under existing statutes without excessive administrative burden and
without any demonstrable decline in discipline or morale.
Under the present system, the dilemma of the low-ranking en-
listed accused should be obvious. He may request trial by military
judge alone and quite possibly receive a more severe sentence. He
may accept an all-officer panel and hope that company grade officers
more likely to be sympathetic towards him will be assigned to the panel.
He may request enlisted membership hoping that his particular conven-
ing authority believes that lower-ranking enlisted men are mature and
responsible enough to perform jury duty.
The differences in availability of junior enlisted personnel on
courts-martial between services and commands within the same service
are considerable. The requirements of due process or equal protection
cannot justify such a system of inequality by recourse to a 200 year
old history which has no application to the modem military,'32 or by
allowing congressional action under the auspices of Article I, which is
unsupported by any clear showing of necessity.
In the absence of a right to direct review by the Supreme Court,
and because of Congress' hesitancy to reform the Uniform ',Code of Mil-
itary Justice, the burden of judicial action necessarily falls on the Court
of Military Appeals. That court has refused to apply military due proc-
ess requirements to court-martial panel selection. A representative se-
lection procedure could be required by the court by re-evaluating the
requirements of military due process. Alternatively, the requirement
could be imposed under the implied equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment.
In the absence of judicial action, reform may be implemented by
Congress through its Article I powers. The president may direct "pro-
cedural" modifications in the selection process and await judicial deter-
mination whether such procedures are in conflict with the congressional
intent underlying article 25. But immediate action can be, and is,
being taken by the military itself. The convening authority is increas-
ingly aware that there is no inconsistency between fairness and disci-
pline. If the trend continues, the court-martial will become a court of
justice for all military personnel.
132. The enormous increase in the size of the military forces, the expansion of
court-martial jurisdiction into criminal cases, the number of Americans subject to mili-
tary service, and the increased educational level and training of the modem enlisted per-
son are factors which were nonexistent, and probably undreamed of, in 1789. See Wie-
ner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. REv.
266, 298-302 (1958).
[Vol. 2
